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Litton v. NLRB: Evolution of the Post-Expiration
Duty to Arbitrate Grievances
I. INTRODUCTION
Although seemingly counterintuitive, contract provisions can, in
some circumstances, outlive the contracts containing them. For instance,
many binding arbitration clauses have survived the courts' scrutiny despite
expiration of their underlying collective bargaining agreements. Over the
years, courts have adopted and abandoned a variety of standards defining
what constitutes a binding post-expiration duty to arbitrate grievances.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Litton v. NLRB2 clarified and arguably
narrowed the circumstances in which post-expiration grievances may be
subject to a binding arbitration clause. The Litton Court held that in order
for a post-expiration grievance to be arbitrable, it must: 1) involve facts
and occurrences that arose before expiration, or 2) stem from a right
vested or accrued under the contract, or 3) pertain to a contractual right
which, under ordinary contract interpretation, would survive the collective
bargaining agreement.
3
A brief review of the context in which collective bargaining
occurs is necessary to understanding the Court's decision in Litton.
Underlying the collective bargaining agreement is the unilateral change
doctrine, which states that an employer commits an unfair labor practice
if, without bargaining to impasse, it effects a unilateral change of an
existing term or condition "Pending renewal or renegotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement, the parties are prohibited by the National
Labor Relations Act from unilaterally changing terms and conditions of
employment established by mandatory bargaining subjects."I However, in
Litton, the Court held that the unilateral change doctrine did not impose a
statutory duty upon employers to arbitrate post-expiration grievances.6
The dispute in Litton focused on whether an arbitration clause in
an expired collective bargaining agreement was binding during the hiatus
between expiration and the signing of a new agreement. The union argued
that, by refusing to arbitrate employees' post-expiration grievances, Litton
had implemented a unilateral change without bargaining to impasse.
1. See generally Paul Bosnac, Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement:
Survivabliy of Terms and Conditions of Employme, 4 LAB. LJ. 715 (1988).
2. 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991).
3. Id.
4. Bosnac, supra note 1, at 715. Once the employer has bargained to impasse, it may
then make a unilateral change in a mandatory subject. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) & (b)(3).
5. Bosnac, supra note 1, at 715 (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)).
6. 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991).
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Because a unilateral change had been made without bargaining to impasse,
the union argued that Litton had committed an unfair labor practice.7
Drawing upon the divergent standards devised by its predecessors, the
Litton Court designated the three situations mentioned above as
justifications for subjecting a grievance to an arbitration clause contained
in an expired collective bargaining agreement.
This Note asserts that the three-pronged test in Litton creates
fairer standards than those suggested by its predecessors for judging
whether an arbitration clause survives expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement. Section H establishes an historical context for analyzing Litton
by discussing the primary cases leading up to the decision. Section I
explains the factual context of Litton and analyzes the Court's holding.
Section IV analyzes several decisions since Litton, focusing on how the
Litton standards work in practice. Section V critiques the Litton standards
and discusses their viability as indicators of the post-expiration duty to
arbitrate. The conclusion suggests alternatives to, or modifications of, the
Litton standards.
HI. PRIMARY CASES PRECEDING LITON
A. NLRB v. Kate
In Katz, the employer unilaterally granted merit increases and
changed sick-leave and wage-increase policies while it was engaged in
contract negotiations on those matters with the union. The Court held:
It is a violation of the duty to bargain collectively imposed by
[29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)] of the National Labor Relations Act for
an employer, without first consulting a union with which it is
carrying on bona fide contract negotiations, to institute changes
regarding matters which are subjects of mandatory bargaining
under [29 U.S.C. § 158(d)] and which are in fact under
discussion.9
7. What constitutes "impasse" is a matter of judgment. See Jacob Hart, Fundanenzai
Laws and Techniques of Collective Bargaining, R 176 ALI-ABA 1235, 1247-48 (1992).
8. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
9. Id. at 737. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1992) states that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) defines the obligation to
bargain collectively as: "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement. . . .'
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The Court asserted that the employer's unilateral action
constituted a refusal to negotiate, contrary to the statutory duty to bargain
collectively.'* The effect of Katz was to compel maintenance of the
status quo during the negotiation period following expiration. Finally, the
Court conceded that although there might be an excuse or justification for
unilateral action, none was presented in Katz.'
B. Hilton-Davis Chemical Co. and Local 342 1
The issue in Hilton-Davis was whether a party breaches its
statutory obligation to bargain in good faith as to terms and conditions of
employment by refusing to adhere to the arbitration procedures in an
expired contract, without bargaining to impasse or acquiring the other
party's consent to terminate the procedure." The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) found that Hilton-Davis had not breached its
statutory duty under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) to bargain in good faith by its
post-expiration refusal to arbitrate." The NLRB specified that the duty
to bargain does create an obligation to meet and confer but does not create
an obligation to agree to a proposal or to make a concession.'
Consequently, Hilton-Davis was statutorily required to meet and confer on
grievances arising during the hiatus but was not required to resolve such
grievances through arbitration' The NLRB stated that arbitration is
strictly a "consensual surrender of the economic power which the parties
are otherwise free to utilize."1 ' Thus, Hilton-Davis defined arbitration as
a "creature of contract," a voluntary surrender of power that does not
outlive the underlying contract.'
C. Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery and Confectionery Workers
Union
In Nolde, the union exercised its right to terminate a collective
10. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
11. Id.
12. 185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970).
13. Id. at 242.
14. Id. at 241.
15. Id. at 242.
16. Id.
17. 185 N.L.R.B. at 242.
18. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. and Local 342, 185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970).
19. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
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bargaining agreement. The employer subsequently closed its plant and
refused to arbitrate the issue of the workers' entitlement to severance pay.
The Court held that the dispute over severance pay "arose under" the
expired collective bargaining agreement and was, therefore, subject to
arbitration.'
The agreement in Nolde provided that "the contract was to remain
in effect until July 21, 1973 and thereafter, until such time as either a new
agreement was executed... or the existing agreement was terminated...
."I However, the Court concluded that the arbitration clause was not
intended to end automatically with the contract.' The Court further
stated that the strong presumption favoring arbitrability must be "negated
expressly or by clear implication. "2 The language of the Nolde contract
did not express or imply such a negation of the presumption. Thus, Nolde
applied the "arises under" standard to determine the viability of post-
expiration arbitration.
D. American Sink Top & Cabinet Co. and Millmen-Cabinet Makers
Industrial Carpenters Union Local No. 550
The union's complaint in American Sink Top was that the
employer had unilaterally eliminated the grievance procedure under a
recently expired collective bargaining agreement, thereby violating 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (5). Through application of a standard very
similar to the Nolde "arises under" test, American Sink Top also permitted
post-expiration arbitration. The Board found that the employer had
violated the agreement and held that arbitration was permissible after the
agreement's lapse if the dispute concerned an obligation arguably created
by the expired agreement.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 246.
22. Id. at 253.
23. Id. at 250-51. The court also recognized that a party cannot be compelled to
arbitrate any matter without a contractual obligation to do so but added that termination of a
collective bargaining agreement did not automatically extinguish a party's duty to arbitrate
grievances arising under that contract.
24. 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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E. Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. and Local Union No. 1392'
In Indiana and Michigan, the collective bargaining agreements
expired, and the employer issued a statement to its unions that arbitration
would not be used for grievances during the hiatus. The NLRB held that
the employer's abandonment of initial arbitration was a unilateral change
in the grievance procedure in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The
NLRB stated that the policy of industrial peace was not served by
"allowing one party to unilaterally alter or abandon the procedure by
which the parties have customarily resolved disputes."' In addition, the
NLRB reaffirmed Hilton-Davis for the notions that a commitment to
arbitrate arises solely from mutual consent and that the National Labor
Relations Act does not create a statutory obligation to arbitrate.?9
However, the NLRB disaffirmed the Hilton-Davis court's finding that an
employer is free to abandon the arbitration procedure during a contractual
hiatus.3 Instead, Indiana and Michigan upheld the Nolde rule that an
arbitration commitment survives in certain circumstances.
31
I. ANALYSIS OF LnToN v. NLRB
A. The Dispute
The dispute in Litton centered around the post-expiration
arbitration of grievances concerning a seniority clause for layoffs. The
collective bargaining agreement provided that in the case of layoffs,
seniority would be the determining factor, if other things such as aptitude
and ability were equal. It also provided that any alleged violation of the
agreement or construction of the contract would be referred to arbitration.
Approximately one year after the agreement expired, the employer laid off
six of its most senior employees. The union filed grievances alleging
violations of the seniority clause, but the employer refused to comply with
the agreement's grievance and arbitration procedure.' An
Administrative Law Judge found that Litton's refusal to comply with the
27. 284 N.L.R.B. 53 (1987).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 57.
30. Id. at 59.
31. Id.
32. 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991).
33. Id. at 2219.
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grievance and arbitration procedure violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) &
(5).3 The NLRB affirmed in part and reversed in part, stating that a
complete repudiation of the obligation to arbitrate any grievance after
expiration violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (5). However, it refused to
order arbitration in this case because the grievance did not arise under the
agreement.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered
enforcement of the NLRB's order, except for the portion that held that the
seniority clause disputes were not arbitrable. The court held that the
seniority rights had arisen under the agreement and were, therefore,
arbitrable.'
B. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent
that it had refused to enforce the NLRB's order in its entirety.37 The
Court refused to extend the unilateral change doctrine to impose a
statutory duty to arbitrate post-expiration grievances." In accordance
with Hilton-Davis, the Court asserted that parties who want an arbitration
clause to survive a contract should expressly provide for such a
contingency.3 ' Concluding that Litton was precisely within the Nolde
rationale, the Court recognized the necessity of applying the "arises under"
test.40 The Court further defined the Nolde presumption favoring the
arbitration of post-expiration disputes "arising under" the contract. The
Court limited the presumption to three situations:
A post-expiration grievance can be said to arise under the
contract only [1] where it involves facts and occurrences that
arose before expiration, [2] where an action taken after
expiration infringes a right that accrued or vested under the
agreement, or [3] where, under normal principles of contract
interpretation, the disputed contractual right survives expiration
of the remainder of the agreement.' The Court found that
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2219-20.
36. Id. at 2220.
37. Littonv. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2227-28 (1991).
38. Id. The court upheld Hilton-Davis' position that an arbitration clause does not, by
operation of the NLRA, continue in effect after expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement.
39. Id. at 2222.
40. Id. at 2225.
41. Id.
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none of the three standards applied and therefore imposed no
duty to arbitrate upon Litton.
The Court also stated that although the NLRB could interpret
collective bargaining agreements in unfair labor practice adjudications, it is
neither the sole nor primary source of authority.4 Arbitrators and courts
are still the primary source of contract interpretation. For example, in
Litton the Court first had to determine whether the parties had agreed to
arbitrate the dispute before submitting it to an arbitrator for resolution of
the underlying issue. Therefore, the Court held that the NLRB's decision
not to order arbitration of the post-expiration grievances was not subject to
substantial deference. The Court refused to defer to the NLRB because
the decision was not based upon statutory authority of the NLRB but
rather, was based upon the Board's interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. 4
C. Dissent
Justice Marshall made two main points in his dissenting opinion.
First, he asserted that the Nolde presumption applies whenever the parties'
dispute is based on different perceptions of a provision of the expired
contract." This proposition stated a broader rule than the majority,
which only applied the "arises under" test in three situations. Adoption of
Justice Marshall's position would serve as a continuation of the vague
standard produced by the Nolde "arises under" test. Second, Marshall
stated that the question of post-expiration arbitrability should be
determined by arbitrators and not by the courts. This argument is based
on the assumption that arbitrators are better qualified to handle the issue of
arbitrability.4  Marshall's position would effectively force parties into
arbitration as a means of resolving the issue of arbitrability. Both parties
would suffer if the issue were ultimately found to be not arbitrable because
resources would have been wasted on a process deemed to be an
inappropriate means of resolution. Contrary to the majority's mandate of
specific inclusion of arbitral extension beyond the life of the contract,
Justice Marshall stated that parties who do not want post-expiration
42. Litton v. NLRB, III S. Ct. 2215,2223 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Paul F. Hodapp, The U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Duty to Arbitrate Post-Contract
Grievances, 42 LAB. .J. 827, 828 (1991).
45. Littonv. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215,2229 (1991).
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arbitration must expressly exclude it from their contracts.' This
essentially creates a reverse-Nolde presumption, requiring parties to
actively evade arbitration.
D. Impact of Litton
One way to gauge the significance of Litton is to evaluate its
impact on the viability of prior decisions. The most significant
predecessor of Litton is Nolde. Although Litton further defined Noide's
"arises under" test by articulating three situations in which it is applicable,
Litton actually narrowed the Nolde test by limiting it to those three
circumstances. This narrowing of the Nolde standard will enable parties
and courts to clearly distinguish arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues.
The three standards of Litton comport with the Hilton-Davis
"creature of contract" theory by limiting arbitration to situations which
essentially are products of the original contract. However, in practice,
they may extend beyond Hilton-Davis by permitting arbitration of issues
which would be arbitrable under general principles of contract
interpretation, whether or not such issues are expressly provided for in the
arbitration clause. Indiana and Michigan is still valid to the extent that it
comports with Nolde in mandating post-expiration arbitration when the
dispute arises under the expired agreement. Indiana and Michigan also
survives to the extent that Hilton-Davis is still viable. Although not
abandoned, Katz is limited, in the arbitration context, to requiring
maintenance of the status quo during the hiatus between expiration and
formation of a new contract only if the dispute fits one of the Litton
classifications. Although Litton did not uphold refusal to arbitrate as a per
se statutory violation, as the Court in American Sink Top did, it did create
some significant common law exceptions to an employer's right to decline
post-expiration arbitration.
E. Practical Concerns
This author's primary concern is how the Litton standards will
work in practice. One commentator argues that the Litton standards will
create a new basis for litigation over arbitrability of post-expiration
disputes because courts must first make an ad hoc evaluation of whether a
right has vested or accrued before applying the "arises under" test. 47 It
is also possible that Litton's failure to establish a standard time frame for
46. Hodapp, supra note 44, at 828.
47. Annual Survey of Labor Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 305, 357 (1991-92).
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how long a party can wait after expiration to demand arbitration of post-
expiration disputes will create a problem for both unions and employers in
predicting whether arbitration will be enforced. Finally, Litton's failure to
define "normal principles of contract interpretation" may prove to be a
serious impediment to application of the standard.'
Although the third standard seems vague, courts should be able to
generate adequate precedent to clarify the first two standards because they
are an amalgamation of tests applied over the last thirty years. The best
way to address such concerns is to analyze some of the recent district and
appellate court decisions in which the Litton test has been applied or
analyzed or both.
IV. ANALYSIS OF POST-LI7TON CASES
A. Post Tribune Publishing, Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, Inc.'
In Post, the employer sought a declaration on the arbitrability of a
post-expiration grievance. During the hiatus between the expiration of the
old contract and agreement upon a new one, the union filed a grievance
for the alleged failure of Post to allocate a certain assignment to its
composing room employees. Post refused to submit the grievance to
arbitration after its joint standing committee failed to resolve it.' The
contract contained two pertinent provisions. First, it assigned grievances
to a joint standing committee, and then, if the committee arrived at an
impasse, grievances were referred to arbitration. Second, the contract
stated that conditions prevailing at the expiration of the contract were to
prevail during active negotiation of a new contract.5'
The court held that because the contract provisions extended
application of the contract after expiration, until the parties bargained to
impasse or reached a new agreement, the arbitration clause applied to
post-expiration grievances. ' Although upholding the Nolde presumption
of arbitrability because the contract specifically provided for post-
expiration arbitration, the court recognized Litton for the premise that:
An arbitration clause will not by operation of the NLRA
48. Id. at 358.
49. 767 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
50. Id. at 938.
51. Id. at 937-38.
52. Id. at 949.
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continue in effect after the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and in the
absence of a contract provision which eliminates a hiatus
between the expiration of the old contract and the execution of
the new contract, an expired contract has by its own terms
released all its parties from their respective contractual
obligations, except obligations already fixed under the contract
but as yet unsatisfied.P
The court also acknowledged that the presumption of arbitrability
does not apply indefinitely after the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement.' In Post, the court found that the contract sufficiently
limited the duration of the post-expiration duty to arbitrate. The duty
lasted during active negotiations, until reaching impasse or a replacement
agreement."
Post squarely applied part three of the Litton test, which provides
that a grievance "arises under" an expired contract if it would survive
expiration under normal principles of contract interpretation." The
arbitration clause in this case would clearly survive expiration under a
normal construction of the underlying contract. The Post contract
expressly stated that the arbitration clause was to extend through the hiatus
between expiration and impasse or new agreement, as long as active
negotiations were being conducted.s Thus, the concern over the
ambiguity of what constitutes normal contract principles is resolved in this
case by the express terms of the contract. The only reasonable
construction of the contract is that the arbitration clause was meant to
outlive the underlying contract.
B. Cumberland Typographical Union No. 244 v. The Times and
Alleganian Co.'
The court in Cumberland held that an employer was required by
the Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a)" to arbitrate a dispute,
53. Id. at 947 (citing Litton v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215,2221 (1991)).
54. Post Tribune Publishing, Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 767 F. Supp.
935, 944 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
55. Id. at 945.
56. Litton v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215,2225 (1991).
57. 767 F. Supp. 935, 945 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
58. 943 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1991).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
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concerning a lifetime job guarantee provision, that arose under the expired
collective bargaining agreement." The court also cited Litton for the
proposition that "[t]he cases interpreting Nolde have held that in order to
'arise under' an expired contract, a dispute must involve rights which to
some degree have vested or accrued during the life of the contract."'
Although this statement is an explanation of part two of the Litton test, it
does not encompass parts one and three, "facts and occurrences arising
pre-expiration" and "normal principles of contract interpretation."
Perhaps, the court chose the "vested or accrued rights" standard of the
Litton test as the most supportive of Cumberland. However, the same
result could also be reached under the "normal principles of contract
interpretation" standard. The court's recognition of Litton as holding that
"arises under" means that a dispute must involve rights vested or accrued
during the life of the contract is a disturbingly limited reading of the
explicit three part test set forth in Litton. By not recognizing parts one
and three of the test, the court misconstrues the true holding of Litton and
effectively reverts to the more vague standard of Nolde.
C. Cadillac Industries, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union
The court in Cadillac held that because Litton emphasized that
arbitration requires contractual consent, a post-expiration employee
discharge grievance did not have to be submitted to arbitration." The
court cited the three part test of Litton as the appropriate test of what
"arises under" an expired collective bargaining agreement. Because the
employee's right to be discharged only for just cause was a creation of the
collective bargaining agreement and did not extend beyond expiration,
arbitration was not required under "normal principles of contract
interpretation."" The court noted that the right did not vest or accrue
during the life of the collective bargaining agreement.' The facts of the
case also reveal that the dispute did not arise out of pre-expiration facts or
occurrences. Thus, none of the Litton standards for post-expiration
survival were met.
The court also noted that Litton overruled Nolde to the extent that
60. 943 F.2d 401, 402 (4th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 405 (quoting Littonv. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2225-27 (1991)).
62. 775 F. Supp. 30 (D. P.R. 1991).
63. Id. at 33.
64. Id.
65. Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:1 1993]
Nolde presumed post-expiration arbitrability in the absence of express
provisions to the contrary." Litton held that parties who want arbitration
clauses to extend beyond expiration must expressly consent to such
extensions by agreement.' 7  According to Litton, "a post-expiration
dispute remains arbitrable only if the dispute has its real source in the
collective bargaining agreement. "' This decision appears to correctly
interpret Litton by recognizing its reversal of the Nolde presumption of
arbitrability.
D. Kelly v. Mercoid Corp.'
Although the holding in this case pertained to preemption, the
court applied part three of the Litton test, "normal principles of contract
interpretation," to a collateral post-expiration arbitration issue. The
contract provided that the agreement "shall automatically renew itself from
year to year thereafter, unless the Company or the Union gives written
notice to the other party to amend, modify or terminate within not less
than sixty (60) days prior to any expiration date."7* Because neither
party had given notice to the other, the court held that the agreement was
effective.' The court noted that even if the agreement had expired, the
parties' actions reflected a post-expiration intent to be bound by provisions
of the agreement.' Based upon this intent, the court concluded that,
under "normal principles of contract interpretation," the right to arbitrate
had survived the contract.7
Kelly presented an unexpected application of part three of the
Litton test in the context of preemption. The court did not make a clear
showing of how it arrived at an application of Litton. Its footnoted
reference to Litton simply stated that for reasons previously discussed, part
three of the test was applicable."" Presumably, the reference to previous
discussion pertained to the conduct of both parties, reflecting an intent to
continue the grievance and arbitration procedure, despite expiration. A
66. Id. at 32 n.3.
67. Cadillac Indus., Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 775 F.
Supp. 30, 32 (D. P.R. 1991) (quoting Litton v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2222 (1991)).
68. Id.
69. 776 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
70. Id. at 1251.
71. Id. at 1252.
72. Id. at 1251-52.
73. Id. at 1253 n.5.
74. Kelly v. Mercoid Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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further inference is that intent reflected by mutual conduct is a "normal
principle of contract interpretation." Although the Kelly court did not find
it problematical, the case presented an illustration of the elusiveness of
standards such as "normal principles of contract interpretation."
E. T & G Construction Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n,
Local 10 0P
In this case, the court recognized the Nolde "arises under" test but
then stated that arbitration clauses were excluded from the rule established
in Katz, making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to effect
unilateral changes in terms and conditions before bargaining to impasse.7'
Consequently, the court found that any grievance arising after the last
possible expiration date would not be arbitrable. The court based this
conclusion on Litton's assertion that an employer need not arbitrate a
grievance "which arises after the collective bargaining agreement has
expired but before the parties have bargained to impasse.""
The court also cited Litton for the proposition that "a party cannot
be forced to arbitrate the arbitrability issue."' However, in this case,
the court held that the contract provided for arbitration of the arbitrability
issue.71  The court further held that the Union's request for arbitration
was untimely because not made within a reasonable time after the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Although, as a general
rule, an arbitration clause can survive a collective bargaining agreement,
the court felt that there was no reason why the general rule should be so
absolute as to permit its abuse by a party that is unreasonably late in
requesting arbitration. "The object of an arbitration clause is to implement
a contract, not to transcend it."80
The T & G opinion failed to apply the three part test of Litton.
Instead, it cited Nolde's "arises under" test.8 ' Although it was apparent
that the dispute did not involve facts or occurrences arising before
expiration and did not pertain to rights possibly vested or accrued under
the expired contract, "normal principles of contract interpretation" had to
75. 791 F. Supp. 127 (D. Md. 1992).
76. Id. at 129-30.
77. Id. at 130.
78. rd. (quoting Littonv. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215,2226 (1991)).
79. Id.
80. T & G Constr. Co. v. Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 100, 791 F. Supp.
127, 130 (D. Md. 1992) (citing Litton v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct 2215, 2225 (1991)).
81. Id. at 129.
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be consulted in order to make the examination complete under Litton.
Although not expressing it as part of the Litton test, the court did analyze
whether the request for arbitration was timely. Concluding, under
"normal principles of contract interpretation," that it was not, the court
effectively showed that part three of the Litton test had not been met. 2
Thus, the dispute was not arbitrable. However, given its disregard of the
Litton test, the court failed to shed any light on what constitutes "normal
principles of contract interpretation."
F. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers,
Inc.Y
In Pepsi, the court found that: 1) The employer had no duty
under an expired collective bargaining agreement to submit a former
employee's grievance to arbitration when the employee's discharge
occurred after the expiration date; 2) the Union did not evidence an
implied agreement to arbitrate disputes during the hiatus between the
expired and new agreements; and 3) the arbitration clause in the new
collective bargaining agreement did not apply to the dispute."m The court
applied part three of the Litton test, "normal principles of contract
interpretation," and found that arbitration did not survive because the
agreement did not explicitly provide for arbitration to continue after
expiration.' Although acknowledging all three parts of the Litton test,
the court did not overtly apply them to Pepsi. However, it is clear from
the facts of the case that the grievance did not involve a right vested or
accrued under the contract and did involve facts or occurrences arising
before expiration. Despite its failure to formally apply each part of the
Litton test, the court reached the correct result in finding the dispute not
arbitrable because it would not survive under "normal principles of
contract interpretation. "
G. NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.'
Although Litton did not directly impact the court's ruling in this
case, some important questions about the scope of the Litton test were
raised. The court applied Litton and concluded that arbitration provisions
82. Id. at 131-33.
83. 958 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1992).
84. rd.
85. Id. at 1334.
86. 964 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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that do not survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement
cannot be imposed unilaterally, even after good faith bargaining to
impasse.' In this case, the employer could not bargain to impasse and
then unilaterally impose its final offer, including an arbitration clause.
This result was mandated because Litton held that "arbitration is a matter
of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."' Although not
addressing Litton's three part test, McClatchy did apply Litton for its
concurrence with Hilton-Davis that arbitration is a creature of contract and
will not be imposed without mutual consent.99
H. Winery, Distillery and Allied Workers, Local Union 186 v. Guild
Wineries and Distilleries?
In Guild Wineries and Distilleries, the court held that the
employer was not required to arbitrate the issue of whether it had a
continuing obligation to pay for its former employees' health insurance
under an expired collective bargaining agreement.' Applying the three-
pronged Litton test, the court found no accrued or vested rights under the
contract and no explicit provision for post-expiration arbitration of
grievances in the contract.' Thus, the "accrued or vested rights" and
"normal principles of contract interpretation" prongs of Litton were not
met. The court appeared to implicitly consider and reject the "facts or
occurrences" prong through its discussion of pre-expiration conditions. In
upholding the employer's argument against post-expiration arbitration, the
court noted that Litton had severely weakened Nolde's presumption in
favor of post-expiration arbitration by limiting it to situations where a
dispute has its real source in the contract.
Guild Wineries and Distilleries, with minimal discussion,
considered and rejected the Litton standards, adding little to the study of
how the three prongs work in practice. However, Guild Wineries and
Distilleries appropriately recognized Litton's weakening of the Nolde
presumption favoring post-expiration arbitrability. Thus, Guild Wineries
87. Id. at 1171.
88. Litton v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2222 (1991) (quoting Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. v.
Local 342, 185 N.L.R.B. 241, 242 (1970)).
89. NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1153, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
90. 812 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
91. Id. at 1037-38.
92. Id. at 1038.
93. Id. at 1037.
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and Distilleries served to reinforce Litton's narrowing of Nolde.
L Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionary,
and Tobacco Workers International Union of America!
The contract between Luden's and the Union provided for
continuation of the contract until a new agreement was reached or until
termination by either party upon sixty days notice." After expiration of
the agreement and before reaching a new agreement, Luden's terminated
the contract." The union requested arbitration of a post-termination
dispute over retroactive wage increase provisions in the expired
contract.' Luden's refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, claiming
that the contract conditioned the duty to pay retroactive wages on
continuation of the prior agreement.' Because Luden's had terminated
the contract, it claimed that the duty to arbitrate had been extinguished."
Luden's filed suit for a declaratory judgment on the issue of the
arbitrability of the retroactive wage dispute.1" The Luden's court
determined that the contract properly permitted post-expiration termination
during the hiatus between expiration and new contract.l"' The court also
found that Luden's had properly terminated the contract.11 Next, the
court addressed the issue of whether termination extinguishes an obligation
to arbitrate.10 The court acknowledged Nolde for the presumption
favoring post-expiration arbitration and Litton for its ruling that Nolde only
applies where a dispute has its real source in the contract. x'
The court applied the three prongs of the Litton test. First, it
found that the "facts or occurrences giving rise to the dispute" did not
arise until well after termination of the contract."' The court cited the
parties' failure to agree to a new contract until after termination as the
94. 805 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
95. Id. at 316 n.3.
96. Id. at 317.
97. Id. at 318 n.6.
98. Id. at 320.
99. Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, 805 F. Supp. 313, 320 (E.D.
Pa. 1992).
100. Id. at 316.
101. Id. at 321-22.
102. Id. at 322-23.
103. Id. at 323-27.
104. Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery, and Tobacco
Workers Int'l Union of America, 805 F. Supp. 313, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
105. Id. at 326.
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focus of the dispute; therefore, the dispute necessarily arose after
termination.'"
Next, the court analyzed the second prong of Litton, "vested or
accrued rights." The court found that the right to retroactive wages, like
the layoff provision in Litton, could not have vested or accrued under the
contract.' v The test for determining whether benefits have accrued is
whether they are due and payable on the date when the employer denies
them.1  Because the contract terminated before approval of a new
contract, retroactive wages were neither due nor payable, according to the
court. ' " The court stated that the right to retroactive wages was strictly
a creature of the contract and concluded that Luden's had successfully
avoided the obligation to pay because the right was neither vested nor
accrued at the time of termination.'
Under normal principles of contract interpretation, the court found
that the retroactive wage right did not survive termination.m The
contract did not explicitly provide for retroactive wage rights to survive
termination.' Rather, the contract contained explicit language that
made it effective until termination or new contract.' Therefore, normal
principles of contract interpretation would not support a post-expiration
duty to arbitrate.
Based upon the analysis above, the court concluded that the Nolde
presumption had not been completely negated, that the retroactive wage
dispute had not met any of the three Litton standards, and that the intent of
the parties was not to arbitrate this dispute.'
The Luden's court did an excellent job of correctly applying the
three-pronged Litton standard. Recognizing the limitations of Nolde, the
court proceeded directly to the Litton test. After a careful analysis, it
reached the well-reasoned conclusion that the test had not been satisfied.
Unlike its predecessors in the post-Litton era, Luden's did not stop after
finding one prong of the test applicable or inapplicable. Rather, the court
106. Id. at 323.
107. Id. at 323.
108. Id. at 326 (citing E.L. Wiegand Div. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982)).
109. Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery, and Tobacco
Workers Int'l Union of America, 805 F. Supp. 313, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
110. rd. at 327.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 326.
114. Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery, and Tobacco
Workers Int'l Union of America, 805 F. Supp. 313, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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fully evaluated the dispute under each prong. In a fact pattern that was
perhaps the most similar to Litton among the cases discussed in this
section, the court reached the same conclusion as the Litton Court - that
there was no duty to arbitrate the post-expiration dispute.
V. ViABiLrrY oF LnTToN
A. The Litton Standards in Practice
Although there has been no Supreme Court challenge to or
application of the standards of post-expiration survival promulgated in
Litton, the district and appellate court decisions discussed above provide an
indication of how the standards work in practice. The "vested or accrued
rights" and "pre-expiration facts or occurrences" standards have not
provided a stumbling block for the courts. Where necessary, the courts
have been able to clearly determine when a right vests or accrues under an
expired contract. Even more clear is the determination of whether
pertinent facts or occurrences are pre- or post-expiration events.
The third Litton standard, however, has posed a problem in
application. The Litton court never defined the "normal principles of
contract interpretation" standard required to determine whether a right
survives expiration. The district and appellate courts, in applying Litton,
did very little to clarify this standard. Instead, they seemed to establish on
an ad hoe basis and without explanation, when "normal principles of
contract interpretation" mandated post-expiration survival and when they
did not. No determinative elements for normal principles of contract
interpretation have emerged. Despite the ambiguity encountered in
application of the "normal principles of contract interpretation" standard,
Litton still provides far more workable standards than its vague
predecessors.
B. Is Litton Conceptually Correct?
Should the arbitration of grievances pursuant to an arbitration
clause in an expired contract be mandated only in the limited
circumstances permitted by Litton? Three possible answers exist to the
question of whether Litton is a conceptually correct decision. The first
position is to always let all terms of an expired contract operate as the
status quo until a new contract is formed. This position is unfairly
restrictive to both employer and employee. The purpose of setting an
expiration date for a contract is to be bound by the contract only during a
specified period. Allowing such an unrestricted extension of terms and
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conditions binds the parties to a contract's terms for an indefinite period
beyond expiration. This indefinite obligation would leave employers and
employees uncertain as to their rights and obligations. The stated term of
the contract would become an unreliable indicator of how long the parties
would actually be bound.
The second position is that parties should never be bound by any
term of an expired agreement. This position would mandate default to
statutory and common law provisions during the hiatus. Such provisions
might be wholly inadequate for the purpose of enforcing obligations
legitimately vested or accrued under the contract, or for grievances
concerning pre-expiration facts or occurrences. It would be inequitable to
deny arbitration of grievances concerning these two categories simply
because the grievances were not filed prior to expiration. Although a right
might originate before expiration, it might not vest or accrue until after
expiration. Similarly, circumstances might prevent a request for
arbitration of pre-expiration facts or occurrences until after expiration. In
both of these situations, the grievance would be a product of the contract,
but this position would deny resolution according to the terms of the
contract. The third position, which is favored by this author, is that the
limited allowance of post-expiration arbitration under Litton is a fair
standard. If parties indicate an intent at the time of contract formation to
permit post-expiration arbitration of certain subjects, such intent should be
upheld. Although Litton provided three standards, only two can
realistically be anticipated in the original contract. The parties may create
potential rights that will vest or accrue after expiration, or the parties may
expressly state an intent that arbitration survive the contract through the
hiatus. The third standard, "pre-expiration facts or occurrences," is not
completely foreseeable. However, the possibility of a dispute over
arbitrability is somewhat reduced under Litton if: 1) The parties know a
right will vest or accrue after expiration, or 2) the parties expressly
provide for post-expiratior arbitration, or 3) it is evident that "normal
principles of contract interpretation" would mandate post-expiration
arbitration. Not only does Litton provide a more definite standard than its
predecessors by narrowing the Nolde "arises under" test, but it also
provides a fairer standard. Neither public policy, statutory law, nor
common law mandate a result differing from the Litton standards.
In comparison to its predecessors, the Litton three-pronged test
created a far more workable standard for employers, unions, and the
courts. The district and appellate cases examined above reveal that each
prong of the test works in practice. By narrowing the Nolde "arises
under" test, Litton eliminated much of the accompanying ambiguity.
Litton created a fairer standard by mandating post-expiration arbitration in
three discrete situations. Armed with knowledge of the Litton decision,
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representatives of labor and employers will be able to create contracts that
accurately reflect their post-expiration obligations. Consequently, parties
will be better able to avoid future disputes and to distinguish those
situations in which post-expiration disputes will or will not be arbitrable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Litton is the product of a logical evolution of the unilateral change
doctrine and post-expiration arbitration obligations from Katz to the
present. While recognizing that arbitration is strictly a matter of mutual
consent, Litton concluded that a presumption of continued mutual consent
may sometimes be appropriate after the contract expires. By carefully
limiting the situations in which such extension is permissible, Litton
created both an equitable and a workable standard for the evaluation of
grievances in the often ambiguous context of the post-expiration hiatus.
Diane Fox
